Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1963

State of Utah v. Bryant S. Jacobs et al : Brief of
Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Pratt Kesler; C. F. Williams; Attorneys for Respondent;
M. V. Backman; Glen El Fuller; Richard M. Taylor; Attorneys for Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Jacobs, No. 9949 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4333

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

UNtVERSllY 0~ UTAH.
61964

IN THE SUPREME COUR-fPRl
OF THE
LAW U'::-'.ARY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and
through its Ro?-d .Commission,

Fi L ED

Platnttff-Respondent,

0

CT
.J

2

r:::
•

5

~ 0 r>':k
iJUv

v.
BRIANT S. JACOBS and
BARBARA T. JACOBS, his wife;
DARRELL G. HAFEN and
RAQUEL E HAFEN, his wife;
B.Y.U. EMPLOYEE FEDERAL
CREDIT UNION; and ROAD
RUNNER INN, INC., a
corporation,

Case No.
9949

Defendants-Appellants,
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 5TH DISTRICT
COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, HONORABLE C. NEL
SON DAY, JUDGE.
M. V. BACKMAN of BACKMAN,
BACKMAN & CLARK,
111 Deseret Bldg.,
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
GLEN E. FULLER, Esq.
15 East 4th South
Salt Lkae City, Utah

RICHARD M. TAYLOR, Esq.
Spanish Fork, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
A. PRATT KESLER, Esq.
Attorney General,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., Esq.
Assistant Attorney General,
State Capitol Bldg.,

Salt Lake City, Utah
Auorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX

Page
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF OASE ________

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT -----------------RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL-----------------------STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------

1
2
2

ARGUMENT:
Point 1.

The Court erred in denying appellants' motion for new trial when it appeared that
an attorney-client relationship developed
during the trial of the case between one of
the jurors and one of counsel for plaintiff ____

5

Point 2.
The Court erred in instructing the jury
that the amount which was paid for the
property is immaterial --------------------------------

6

Point 3.
The Court erred in its refusing to permit
appellants to show the plans which had
been made for the development of the property taken by plaintiff ----------------------------------

8

Point 4.
The Court erred in restricting defendants
evidence to only those uses permitted under
existing zoning laws in Washington County -------------------------------------------------------------------- 13
CO NCL USI 0 N ------------------------------------------------------ 34

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED
Page
Arizona v. McMinn (Arizona 1960) 355 P2d
900 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 22
Brubaker v. State, (New York, 1963) 236 NYS
2d 395 -------------------------------------------------------------- 24
Commissioner v. Holt, (Utah 1963) 381 P2d
724 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 33
Commissioner v. Tallahassee, (Florida 1959),
116 S.2d 762 ---------------------------------------------------- 22
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. S. L. County, 250
P2d 940 ---------------------------------------------------------- 11
Mackie's Petition, (Michigan, 1961) 108 N.W.
2d 755 ------------------------------------------------------------ 24
O'Neil v. State Dept. of Roads, (Neb. 1963) 118
N. W. 2d 616 -------------------------------------------------- 30
Park Commissioner v. Fitch, (Kansas, 1959),
33 7 P2d 1034 ------------------------------------------------ 23
People v. Donovan, (California 1962), 396
p 2d 1 -------------------------------------------------------------- 21
Rapid Transit Co. v. U.S. (Tenth Circuit, 1961)
295 F 2d 465 ------------------------------------------------ 24
Regnier Builders v. Linwood School District,
(Kansas 1963) 369 P2d 316) ---------------------- 24
Salt Lake County Cottonwood San. Dist. v.
Toone, (1960), 11 U2d 232, 357 P2d 486 ______ 12
State of Utah v. Holt, (May 27, 1963) 381 P2d
724 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 33
Washington v. Motor Freight Terminals, Inc.
(Washington 1960), 357 P2d 861 ________________ 21
\Yeber Basin v. Ward, 10 U2d 29, 347 P2d 862 ____

8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1
TEXTS AND AUTHORITIES

Page
7 A L R 2d 77 4 ----------------------------------------------------7, 8
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec. 12.322 ---------- 33
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, p. 157 ------------------ 11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I~

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and
through its Road Commission,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BRIANT S. JACOBS and
BARBARA T. JACOBS, his wife;
DARRELL G. HAFEN and
RAQUEL E HAFEN, his wife;
B.Y.U. EMPLOYEE FEDERAL
CREDIT UNION; and ROAD
RUNNER INN, INC., a
corporation,
Defendants-Appellants,

Case No.

9949

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action in Eminent Domain to condemn 33.33 acres of real property and 0.14 acres
for an irrigation easement, used in the construction
of the interstate highway through Washington County near the city of Washington, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury which brought in a
verdict in favor of the property owners of $16,000.00
from which verdict and judgment defendants appeal.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(Note: There appears to be at least 3 volumes
of record each containing pages beginning with 1
etc. We have therefore taken the liberty to designate
the volumes A, B, and C, and will refer to pages in
the designated volumn. Where we refer to the record
Tr. it will refer to Volumn I and II of transcript of
testimony, also designated G. Volumn A comprises
the pleadings, etc. as shown by the index. We have
not designated the transcript on the pre-trial.)
The property so condemned was a part of a 40acre tract conveyed by warranty deed by the former
owners, Israel Neilson and Caddie Neilson, to Briant
S. Jacobs and Barbara T. Jacobs, his wife (R. 15B).
The 40-acre tract was a part of a tract comprising
185.09 acres optioned at a price of $100,000, by said
Neilsons to Darrell G. Hafen and his wife who assigned their interest (R 44-45B) (R 124C), after
having exercised the option to purchase the property
( R 6B), to said Jacobs, who held title to the whole
of said property in trust for Road Runner Inn, Inc.
( R 84B), which company acquired the properties for
the purpose of constructing and developing a golf
course, and other construction which would improve
economically the surrounding area of Washington,
Utah, (Ex. D-1) (R 15B).
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The option by which the Road Runner Inn group
acquired the interest in the 185.09 acres was dated
June 30th, 1960. There was an amendment thereto
in writing bearing date September lOth 1960, (Ex.
D-2) giving and granting to Hafen, the optionee, the
right, upon payment of $30,000 cash and $10,000 in
stock of Road Runner Inn Corporation to select 40
acres of the property in one piece. To raise the
$30,000 cash with which to pay off Mr. Neilsen, Mr.
Jacobs mortgaged the 40-acre tract to BYU Employees Credit Union which mortgagee advanced
$33,000 and took the mortgage on that 40-acre tract
of which the state took 33.03 acres for the Highway,
(R 58-59B) which money was to be paid back to the
Credit Union from that realized out of this acreage
( R 60B). This acreage was the best property in the
whole piece (R 62B) (R 65B). The mortgage to the
Credit Union covered the 33.03 acres taken by the
state and an additional tract of 6.37 acres. At the
time of the entering into the option by Hafen on
June 30, 1960 and the amendment of September
10, 1960 Hafen did not know where the right-of-way
was to be located precisely (R 67B).
Defendants' witness Werner Kiepe placed a
,·alue on that property taken by the state at the time
of taking of $67,000 or approximately $2,000 an
acre. The State's witness Edmond D. Cook placed a
value on the property at $400 per acre or a total of
$13,332 on the tract taken and $56 on that property
taken for the easement. State's witness, Cl. Francis
Solomon, testified to a value of $16,000 total, basing
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his value on the highest and best use of the property
as agriculture and grazing (R 376C).
A portion of the property taken for highway
purposes, as is shown on the map attached to plaintiff's complaint, is situated within the town or city
of Washington, Utah which had no zoning ordinance.
That property taken by the state without said city is
zoned agriculture and grazing, the grazing zoning
permits the construction of golf courses. The trial
court in its instructions to the jury instructed that
the property was on the 20th day of September, 1962
zoned by Washington County for grazing and agricultural usage and the trial court further instructed
the jury that the usage of the property for residential subdivision and commercial enterprises or either
of them was prohibited by the County Ordinance.
The court refused to permit defendant-appellant, Road Runner Inn to show the amount it had
contracted to pay for the property. The trial court
also refused to permit counsel for appellants to refer
to that testimony of state's witness C. Francis Solomon pertaining to the "unusual circumstances" of
Jacobs mortgaging the 40-acre tract to which he received a deed from Neilson to BYU Employees Federal Credit Union, to the jury. (R 403C) The Court
also refused to permit appellants to introduce the
articles of incorporation of Road Runner Inn, Inc.
which would show the purpose for which that corporation was organized.
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ARGUMENT
Point I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WHEN
IT APPEARED THAT AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPED DURING THE
TRIAL OF THE CASE BETWEEN ONE· OF THE
JURORS AND ONE OF COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF.
Charles M. Pickett, Esq. who was not associated
as counsel for the state until the commencement of
the trial has, since his admission to the bar, lived in
the city of St. George and has practiced law in the
county of Washington, Utah, ever since his admission, which covers a period of many years. Mr. Pickett is and has been prominent in civic and political
affairs in the county of Washington, and has held
the office of County Attorney, and at the time of the
trial of this case held the office of District Attorney.
Appellants had moved, prior to the association of Mr.
Pickett as counsel for the state, for a change of place
of trial, which motion was denied. Upon Mr. Picket
becoming associated as counsel for plaintiff, each of
the appellants again renewed their motions for
change of place of trial, which motions were again
denied.
\Yhile the attorney-client relationship did not
exist between Mr. Pickett and juror, Clifton Wilson,
at the commencement of the trial, it developed dur-
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ing the trial. The association of Mr. Pickett with the
case being tried at St. George, Washington County,
Utah, was highly prejudicial to appellants and their
motion for new trial should have been granted. It
was admitted by Mr. Pickett that during the trial
of the case, Juror Wilson did consult with Mr. Pickett on a legal matter the nature of which most certainly constituted an attorney-client relationship.
Point II.
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT THE AMOUNT WHICH WAS
PAID FOR THE PROPERTY IS IMMATERIAL.
During the direct examination of witness Hafen
he testified as follows:
Q. Mr. Hafen, at the present time well, with-draw that. Now, pursuant to payments that
have been made, has Israel Neilson actually
deeded all or part of the propertyA. He deeded part of the property, 40 acres.
Q. Part of it is deeded from him at the present time?
A. Yes, we paid him $40,000.00.
MR. CAMPBELL:
Now, wait a minute. Your Honor. I realize
that the objection- he isn't being responsive
and I think this witness is volunteering information and attempting to put it before this
Court by· way of his own speech things that
counsel is not asking; and I ask the Court to
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instruct the witness to only answer those questions which are submitted to him by his attorney.
THE COURT:
All right, Mr. Hafen you heard Mr. Campbell's statement; and I will put it to you this
way: Just answer counsel's questions and not
volunteer information. I have already sustained the objection to the amount of money
that was paid in this matter. Now I instruct
you gentlemen to put out of your minds, entirely disregard Mr. Hafen's last statement
which was volunteered. The fact that he paid
$1 or $40,000 or any amount in between is immaterial in this case. What he's paid on this
is entirely immaterial. If he paid $10, we certainly wouldn't put that as a valuation of this
property. If he paid $90,000, we wouldn't put
that as a valuation, so the amount he has paid
is immaterial. You are instructed to disregard
it, and you, Mr. Hafen, don't volunteer, just
answer counsel's questions. (Tr. 121)
Counsel did not move to strike the answer given
by the witness.
While counsel for defendants stated that none
of the questions relative to partial payment were designed to establish any price. Still the fact that the
court instructed the jury as it did was highly prejudicial and the instruction was against the law.
In 7 ALR 2d 774 the law is stated as follows:
Evidence of the price paid by the owner of
property sought to be condemned is admissible
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as bearing on its market value, unless the sale
was too remote in point of time from the condemnation proceedings to afford a fair criterion of present value.
It was apparent that the acquisition of the property was not too remote in time .
The Utah Courts followed the law as announced
in 7 ALR 2d 774 in Weber Basin v. Ward, 10 U2d
29, 34 7 P2d 862.
Point III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSING TO
PERMIT APPELLANTS TO SHOW THE PLANS
WHICH HAD BEEN MADE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN BY
PLAINTIFF.
Appellants had staked out a golf course taking
in that property condemned, they had also procured
architects plans for other development including
some residences. One of the exhibits attached to
plaintiff's complaint shows a part of the property
taken as being within a dedicated subdivision and
still the trial court refused to permit appellants to
testify to their plans, but confined appellants' witnesses testimony to only a part of that development
actually made on the land itself. A part of the testimony of witness Hafen and the rulings made by the
court are as follows :
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Q. And for what purposes were expenditures
of funds made by the Roadrunner Inn toward
development of that area prior to this date.
September 20, 1962?
MR. CAMPBELL:
If the Court please, I am going to object to
that on the ground and for the reason there's
no foundation laid to show that whatever intended use was made, was going to be made of
this property, or had any connection or association with the property that the State seeks
to acquire in the case. Until that foundation is
laid and properly laid, this testimony would
be completely immaterial and irrelevant in determining what the willing buyer would pay
for property and the willing seller would dispose of the property for as of that date.
THE COURT:
Well, the objection is approved, Mr. Fuller.
It occurs to me if some steps were made to
develop the property and something was done
on the property, I want to hear about that;
but if they went over some place and took some
steps not concerned with thatMR. FULLER:
Our line of questionig goes to the steps pertaining to the property itself.
THE COURT:
~ know, pertaining to the property; but was
It on the property?
THE COURT:
Mr. Hafen, let me ask you some questions. Did
you make any improvements to the 185 acres
prior to September 20, 1962?
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THE WITNESS:
Well, we dug some foundation holes for the
buildings and staked out a golf course and
whether or not it includes our architectural
plans or things of that THE COURT:
Architectural pans are not work on the
ground, are they? I'm asking you what work
was done on the real estate itself?
The record shows further questions propounded
by the court with the folowing result:
THE COURT:
All right. With regard to your question Mr.
Fuller, I must sustain the objection to it other
than as he's now answered. He's told us the
steps that he has taken to develop the 185
acres on the land.
MR. FULLER:
You are referring to the physical activities on
the ground?
THE COURT:
Physical activities.
MR. FULLER:
You are limiting it to that?
THE COURT:
Right. (Tr. 149-153)
In Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, at page
157 it is said:
Evidence of the value of property for any use
to which it is reasonably adapted is admissible, but such evidence must be limited to a
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bare statement why the property is so adapted
for a particular purpose and. to testimony .of
its value for such purpose, Its uses and Its
particular fitness for such uses.
Generally a witness may give his opinion of
the value of such property based on such uses
and the value thereof, when it has been shown
that he has some knowledge of such uses beyond that of the jurors. Thus evidence of the
market value of the property for the best and
most profitable use to which it may be devoted
in the reasonably near future is admissible.
As bearing upon these issues the owner may
offer a plan showing a possible scheme of development for the purpose for which it is most
available provided it appears that the likelihood of demand for the property for that purpose is such as to affect market value.
If the adaptability for such potential use is
such as to have a positive influence upon present market value it has been held competent
for a witness to express an opinion as to the
adaptability of the property for such purposes. A map or plan which graphicaly illustl·ates the potential use is equaly admissible.
The Utah Court stated in Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. S. L. County, 250 P2d 938 at 940 as follows:
The adaptability of the land sought to be taken
in eminent domain for a special purpose or
use may be considered as an element of value.
If the land possesses a special value to the
owner which can be measured in money, he
has the right to have that value considered
in the estimate of compensation and damages.
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From the necessity of the case the value must
be arrived at from the opinions of well-informed persons based upon the purposes for
which the property is suitable. This is not taking the "value in use" to the owner as contradistinguished from the market value. What is
done is merely to take into consideration the
purposes for which the property is suitable
as a means of ascertaining what reasonable
purchasers would in all probability be willing
to give for it, which in a general sense may
be said to be the market value. In order that
this rule be applicable, it must appear, not
that the property is peculiar, but that the relationship of the owner thereto is peculiar, its
advantages to him more or less exclusive that is, that it is property having value peculiar to the owner only, and without possible
like value to others who may acquire it.
And again in the case of Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District v. Toone, (1960), 11 U2d
232, 357 P2d 486, this Court in speaking through
Mr. Justice Crockett said at page 488:
We have no disposition to disagree with the
defendants' argument that evidence of plans
for a particular use of property may be material and relevant where it is offered as having
some bearing upon its value under the rule
stated above. But the defendants did not propose to proceed upon that premise.
In the instant case appellants did propose to
show the plans which had been made for the particular development of the property and the court was
so advised not only once but on several occasions.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
Point IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN RESTRICTING
DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE TO ONLY THOSE
USES PERMITTED UNDER EXISTING ZONING LAWS IN WASHINGTON COUNTY.
It is recognized procedure and law in a condemnation case that a property owner is entitled to reCl1ive a price for his property according to its fair
market value for its highest and best use to which
it was adaptable on the date of taking. In fact, without first establishing what the highest and best use
of the property was at that time, it is, of course, a
very difficult matter to even attempt to place a price
upon the land. Defendants submit that in this case
they were absolutely prohibited at every point in the
case from developing evidence before the jury as
to the highest and best use of the property.

Before the trial commenced Counsel for Defendants stated:
... And so that the Court is clearly aware of
our position, let me say this : That we are goi~g to proceed under the logical theory of the
h1ghest and best use of the property. We will
not depart from that theory. Furthermore
we are not going to claim any highest and
best use or special use that might be applicable
me~el~ to these ~wners. In short, what we will
claim IS that this property has certain value
for certain uses.
It will be our contention that this value would
apply to any other purchaser or group of pur-
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chasers similarly situated who have knowledge of the adaptability of this property for
various uses. And our contention is in this respect, Your Honor: that the property had a
dual type of usage. Our evidence will go to
the usage being a combination residential,
commercial, and recreational area; and that
that represented at the time of the taking
the highest and best use of the property. ( TR.
26)
Proceeding upon that basis defendants immediately met opposition from plaintiff before the trial
commenced which, for the purpose of this portion of
the Brief, were addressed primarily to the fact that
the contemplated highest and best uses of the property were not actually permitted under the zoning
regulations of Washington County at the time of
taking. The plaintiff's position was stated as follows:
MR. CAMPBELL:
... it is our position, your Honor, and we will
ask the Court to instruct the Jury that as of
the date of service of summons in this case,
September 20, 1962, this property was zoned
partially grazing, partially agricultural by
the County Commission of Washington County and that the zoning ordinance is determinative as to the use to which this property can
be put at that date.
We feel that it is purely speculative and conjectural to receive evidence with respect to
whether or not the County Zoning Commission
and the County Commissioners themselves
may at some time in the future rezone the
property ... ( Tr. 50)
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THE COURT:
... I don't think that you people can present
evidence here, and I am going to stop you,
which will show an illegal or improper use
of these premises under the law. I don't
think we can speculate as to what a county
commissioner might do if his wife persuades
him sufficiently.

I think that it is speculative. I will read your
cases, but my offhand thinking is that it is
speculative and remote, too distant to warrant
the Jury speculating on it. (Tr. 63)
The actual facts were that in 1958 Washington
County, for the first time in its history, adopted a
Zoning Resolution. The resolution is set forth as Exhibit P-8, and also contains a map of the various
areas of Washington County coming within the various zoned areas. It excluded from its operation the
incorporated areas of the county. In fact the town of
'\Vashington which was contiguous to the subject
property and which had a portion of it within its
limits (exhibit attached to complaint), did not have
zoning regulations of any type. Furthermore, in
drawing up the boundaries of the various zoned areas
there was no attempt to set forth any legal descriptions separating the areas. As to the property in
question, part of it lay within an agricultural area
and part of it lay in a grazing area, with the line
dividing the two indicated only upon the map prepared by the county officials. The Zoning Regulation, being very new in the county, contained areas
of inconsistency, as, for instance, golf courses were
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permitted in both residential and grazing areas, but
were omitted from permitted uses in agricultural
areas.
Proceeding upon the basis that a well-informed
purchaser would consider the likelihood that zoning
regulations would be altered or changed if the contemplated usages of an area were such as to appear
reasonably likely of approval by the proper officials,
plaintiffs objected to the opening statement made
by defendants:
MR. CAMPBELL:
... but let it be well known it is the position
of the State of Utah in this case that any
proposed testimony or any statement relative
to any other use than the- that was recognized and permitted under the zoning ordinance at the time of condemnation are inadmissible and I object to Mr. Fuller's statement.
(Tr. 103-104)
Mr. Darrell Hafen, the first witness called by
defendants, was prohibited from giving evidence of
the highest and best use of the subject property other
than for those uses permitted urider the zoning ordinances:
THE COURT:
Mr. Fuller, my thinking on this is that unless
the highest and best use contemplated by the
witness, Mr. Hafen, is within the purview of
the County Ordinance, that is, the property
was zoned, that his statement would be irrelevant and immaterial. That is the way I intend
to rule on it. ( Tr. 131)
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Defendants attempted to prove through Mr.
Hafen and through other witnesses that proceedings
were had with Washington City for a considerable
length of time prior to the condemnation action
whereby the subject properties would have been annexed to Washington City, which had no zoning ordinances or regulations of any kind. This annexation
would have automatically worked to eliminate the
county regulations governing use of the subject properties under the peculiar arrangement then existing
in the St. George area. In fact, within 60 days after
the actual condemnation the city council of Washington City actually approved the annexation.
The following excerpts are taken from the transcript bearing upon the material rulings of the Court
on all offers relating to the probability of rezoning
which existed at the time of taking:
THE COURT:
Well, supposing that as a matter of fact, Mr.
Fuller, Washington City did something the
following day, but supposing that they didn't
do anything for 100 years later? The fact
of the matter is on September 20, which is the
date we are concerned with, nothing had happened. It was not annexed to Washington
City; and my thinking on that is it is irrelevant.
MR. FULLER:
Then you would makeTHE COURT:
I so rule.
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MR. FULLER:
We have an exception to the rule.
THE COURT:
All right. ( Tr. 133)
Q. (By MR. FULLER):
Mr. Hafen, with respect to this property at
the time it was acquired by the State, were any
proceedings being had towards annexation of
it to Washington City?
MR. CAMPBELL:
If the Court please, we object to that on the
ground and for the reason that it is purely
speculative and hypothetical and conjectural.
MR. FULLER:
I am asking him as to a fact, your Honor. (Tr.
131-132)
MR. FULLER:
At this time, your Honor, with respect to the
Court's rulings or series of rulings on two
points that have been made during the course
of direct examination of Mr. Darrell Hafen,
we would like to make a proffer of proof as
to what evidence would be elicited through
Mr. Hafen and have it put on the record. I
will proceed on that basis. As to the first point,
concerning the possibility of a rezoning of the
subject property from agricultural to residential, we would have elicited from Darrell
Hafen and also from Mr. Tobler, who is the
Clerk of Washington City Council, the Recorder- Glen Tobler, the following facts:
First, that the subject property is contiguous
to Washington City and that Washington City
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as such does not have zoning ordinances regulating the building and usage of structures
or other matters of any kind, typically found
under zoning ordinances. That there had been
for sometime discussions with the City Council by Mr. Darrell Hafen and others on behalf
of Roadrunner Inn relative to an annexation
of this 185 acres plus some other grounds retained by Mr. Nielson into Washington CityMR. CAMPBELL:
It was just a discussion, Mr. Fuller, just so we
will know.
MR. FULLER:
-immediately prior to September 20, 1962
and over a period of at least a year before
that; that on November 26, 1962, we quote an
excerptTHE COURT:
November 26th?
MR. FULLER:
Yes, of 1962. I will read in evidence an excerpt
from the Minutes of Washington City Council as follows: "November 26, 1962, Minutes
of Washington City Council Meeting held at
the home of Councilman Ben J oley, Mayor
Quenton Nisson presiding and conducting the
meeting. Opening prayer by Councilman
Rhaldo Turner. Those present were Mayor Q.
Nisson, Glen Tobler, Ervin Hall and Councilmen Rhaldo Turner, Ike Robinson, Ernest
Tanner, Ben Jolley and Hugh Gibson excused
(out of town).
"Also present were Darrell Hafen Bruce
Stucki, Steve Kirkland. Darrell Hafen asked
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to have the land owned by the Roadrunner Inn
to be annexed into Washington City limits.
Ben made the motion to accept the 240 acres
into the city limits, and Rhaldo seconded it.
All voted unanimously on the motion. I certify
this is the true and correct copy of the above
matter of the City Council meeting as above
dated and recorded. Glen Tobler."
Now, we would introduce this evidence both
through Mr. Hafen and the City Recorder of
Washington City. Now, with respect to the
matter and in support of our rule that the
Court permit all relevant evidence pertaining
to a possible rezoning of the subject property,
we would further establish the following facts
through Mr. Hafen and through our witnesses. First, that the subject property is contiguous to Washington City. Secondly, that
the zoning ordinances applicable to this property of Washington County were adopted in
1958 and that zoning is a very new matter in
Washington County; that it has been spotzoned and certified for residential or commercial area since the zoning without any appreciable difficulty being encountered and
that such a zoning for residential purposes
was fairly recently enacted in Middleton. We
would also establish generaly through the evidence of this witness and through our witnesses, that the growth pattern of Washington County and the needs of the community
and those coming into the area are such that
this would be a very logical residential zoning
within the very near foreseeable future under
all the facts and circumstances that have been
brought out by this case and that could be
brought out along the lines indicated.
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We would further show that the general trend
of the community is such that development
of this type have been welcomed and that there
would not reasonably be expected to be opposition to such a movement. (Tr. 162, 163, 164)
There are a multitude of cases all standing for
the proposition that a possibility or probability of
re-zoning should be taken into account in fixing the
value of condemned properties. And the Courts generally hold without exception that it is not necessary
even to go to the point of having members of a city
counsel state what they would probably do about
re-zoning if no condemnation were involved (which
defendants here actually purported to do had they
been permitted). Pertinent excerpts from some of
the cases, together with numerous other authorities,
follow:
People v. Donovan (California, 1962), 369 P.
2d 1:
There was evidence that the city authorities
had considered re-zoning the area in which
defendant's lot was located, but had rejected
the changes, at least to show that the zoning
authorities were contemplating changes in
zoning restrictions. The reasonable probability of a zoning change may be shown by a
variety of factors, including neighborhood
changes and general changes in land use.
Washington v. Motor Freight Terminals, Inc.
(Washington, 1960), 357 P 2d 861:
There is, however, an exception to that rule
i.e., when a particular use of the property, t~
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which it is adapted, is prohibited or restricted
by law, but there is a reasonable probability
that the prohibition or restriction will be modified or removed in the near future, the effect
of such probability upon the value of the property may be taken into consideration ... it is
true that the members of the city council did
not testify as to what they would "probably"
do about a re-zoning, if there were no "freeway" involved. But it is not true, as the state
seems to believe, that such evidence is necessary to prove that there is a reasonable probability that property would be re-zoned in the
near future (absent the Improvement for
which the property is being condemned).
Commissioners v. Tallahassee, (Florida, 1959),
116 s. 2d 762:
We find no fault with the first District Court
of Appeals in adopting the so-called Texas
rule, viz. That even though an existing municipal zoning ordinance may prohibit the use of
the property for stated purposes at the time
of condemnation, nevertheless, if there is a
. reasonable probability that the ordinance may
be changed or an exception made in the foreseeable future, then the value for such use as
may be included in the amendment or exception may be considered.
Arizona v. McMinn (Arizona, 1960) 355 P. 2d
900:
Compensation awarded when land is taken by
eminent domain is the market value of the
land for any use to which it is adapted and
for which it is available. If, therefore, the land

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
is not presently availabe for a particular use
by reason of a zoning ordinance or other restrictions imposed by law, but if you find from
the evidence that there was a reasonable probability of a change in the near future in the
zoning ordinance, or other restrictions, then
the effect of such probability of the minds of
purchasers generally should be taken into consideration in fixing the present market value
of it.

Park Commission of Wichita v. Fitch (Kansas,
1959), 337 p 2d 1034
Mr. Fitch owned a 29 acre tract near the city
of Wichita upon which there were two lakes,
comprising about 15 acres and a sandy beach.
He testified that this property was ideal for
recreational purposes and that he had applied
to the city to have it rezoned so that it could
be used for recreational purposes when the
city extended its limits to include the property. He testified that the property was worth
$60,000.00 to $70,000.00 and then put on two
witnesses who were conversant with the recreational business and who testified to the
value of the property solely from the point
of view of its recreational value. Mr. Fitch was
awarded $50,000.00 The Board of Park Commissioners appealed, one of the grounds being,
that the entire testimony was speculative in
that it assumed recreational purposes, when,
in fact at the time of the taking it was so
zoned that it could not be used for recreational purposes. The Supreme Court ruled against
this argument and in favor of Mr. Fitch. It
said that the Park Commissioners had over-
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looked the fact that the land owner is entitled
to show the value of the land for its most advantageous use.
Other cases clearly supporting the foregoing
proposition of very recent vintage, are as follows:
Regnier Builders v. Linwood School District
(Kansas, 1962), 369 P 2d 316.
Rapid Transit Company v. U. S. (Tenth Circuit,
1961) 295, F. 2 d 465.
Mackie's Petition (Michigan, 1961), 108 N. W.
2d 755.
Brubaker v. State (New York, 1963), 236
N.Y.S. 2d 395.
The cases handed down on the point in recent
years are numerous, and examination of the cases
by counsel for defendants has not revealed a single
jurisdiction contrary to the position that an appraiser or a potential purchaser should be able to place
a value upon property according to its highest and
best use, even though the contemplated usage is prohibited by an existing zoning ordinance, if there is
a reasonable likelihood that the restriction will be
removed. It is submitted that the Court was clearly
in error in its rulings prohibiting the introduction
of evidence along the indicated lines.
The remainder of Mr. Hafen's interrogation
followed the same lines:
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THE COURT:
0. K. Let the record show I have considered
your second matter of the plans for improvement and my ruling will hold with regard to
your proffer on the possibility of rezoning.
It will still stand. ( Tr. 166)
MR. CAMPBELL:
Object to that statement and to any of this
property or any part of this being used for
commercial utilization. As the Court has instructed the witness, and the testimony heretofore indicated, this property was not zoned
for that purpose; and it would be illegal as
of the date of condemnation, September 20,
1962. So I therefore ask the Court to strike
that statement from the record and also the
statement with respect to residential subdivision development, apart from property tracts
being built in connection with farm utilization.
THE COURT:
The Jury instructed to strike from their mind
and memory Mr. Hafen's statement as outlined by Mr. Campbell. (Tr. 172)
THE WITNESS (Mr. Hafen):
... We started a market analysis that we
have run three or four years ago that the
Mayor was willing to supply us with water,
even supplied us with the rate at which the
water - that the City then had in effect in
supplying us with water. So that's a matter
of record in the analysis which hadn't occurred to me until just now. I don't see where
zoning is a problem, if you don't want-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
MR. CAMPBELL:
Mr. Hafen, wait a minute.
THE COURT:
Just stop. Do you have your objection, Mr.
Campbell? (Tr.178)
Counsel for defendants next called Mr. William
F. Bell, an eminent golf course architect, who was
brought from Pasadena, California, for the purpose
of testifying as to the suitability of part of the subject lands for the purpose of installing a golf course
as part of the defendants' plans for development of
the area. It was defendants' purpose, through Mr.
Bell, to point out that there was a definite immediate
need for a golf course in the St. George area, that
this was practically the only course site available
for such purpose, that it was ideally located, and
that any potential purchaser of the subject property
would consider this site to be adaptable for a golf
course and that the time was ripe for the construction for such a facility. Once again the same objections were raised concerning the zoning regulation
in force, even though it was developed that the grazing portion of the lands would actually be permitted
under the zoning ordinances for golf course purposes, and Mr. Bell was prevented from giving any
testimony other than introductory material of a limited nature:

Q. (of Mr. Bell) : And did you go on that property to make an inspection of it to determine
whether all or any portion of it was suitable
for golf course purposes?
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A. (Mr. Bell): Well, I studied it as to its desirability and what kind of layout could be
prepared upon it; and that was - I did make
a preliminary study. I studied the way as to
a standard nine hole golf course, and it was
standard. It was not substandard.

Q. And what factors did you consider as to the
feasibility of all or part of this property for
that purpose?
A. Well, generallyMR. CAMPBELL:
If the Court please, I object to that question
on the ground it has no relationship to the subject property at the time we are talking about
and at the time we are assessing compensation. It is completely foreign to us to which
this property was devoted and couldn't be devoted at September 20, 1962; and while I'm
sure this testimony would be interesting and
I would like to hear it, I think in the interest
of time it is completely irrelevant and has no
- is not germane to the issues in the case
whatsoever.
THE COURT:
You want to be heard, Mr. Fuller?
MR. FULLER:
Yes, we submit, your Honor, that we will tie
the witness's answers to the date of taking
and the conditions that existed at that time;
and we say it is highly material to the issues
on this case as to the issue of highest and best
use of the property at th~ time of taking, or
at least a substantial portion of it.
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THE COURT:
Would you two gentlemen come up here
please?
(Discussion between Court and counsel at the
bench, not reported.)
THE COURT:
The record should show with regard to Mr.
Campbell's objection, and I take it that his
objection runs to the entire line of questions
and not just merely the last question. I'm inclined to agree with him, Mr. Fuller; and
therefore the objection is sustained.
MR. FULLER:
Then, your Honor, to further develop this witness along the lines I have indicated, the ruling would be the same to the entire line of
questions?
THE COURT:
Correct.
MR. FULLER:
So, upon that basis, we have no further questions of Mr. Bell. (Tr. 199, 200)
Defendants next called Mr. Werner Kiepe, one
of the most qualified and recognized appraisers in
the Intermountain area, for the purpose of having
him determine the highest and best use to which the
subject properties were adaptable at the time of
taking, and to thereupon place a value upon the properties according to such highest and best use. The
same line of objections were once again raised, and
Mr. Kiepe was cut rather short in his appraisal of
the property:
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THE WITNESS (Mr. Kiepe):
Well, your Honor, the property is subject to
changes; and there is a Planning and Variance Committee that has the authority to
change this zoning. So I should say in connection with the zoning, a buyer would recognize
the zoning which is in existence and also recognize the fact that there is a body that has
the power to change it; and this I took into
consideration.
THE COURT:
I see. It is somewhat similar to the fact that
we have a legislature that meets every two
years, and sometimes they repeal and sometimes they add and sometimes they modify.
You are saying that there is a body that has
the power to change and modify and add to
or subtract from the zoning.
THE WITNESS (Mr. Kiepe):
Your Honor, I also have the experience of
many years in seeing what such bodies do.
THE COURT:
I think there is merit in Mr. Campbell's objection, Mr. Fuller. It seems to me that where
we have a legal classification of property that
we are concerned with the time of September
20, 1962, the fact that it may possibly be
changed in the future- it's true it may be
changed, but it wasn't changed and it seems
to me we are bound by what the situation was
at the time of the State's taking. Mr. Kiepe
made his appraisal after that date in November of 1962, 30 to 60 days later - possibly
90 days later. It seems to me that we are bound
by that appraiser - by that situation in
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September of 1962 ; and therefore I'm going
to sustain Mr. Campbell's objection. (Tr. 213,
214)
It is standard law, and recent cases support the
proposition, that an appraiser should always consider
the likelihood that a given piece of property would
be re-zoned for reasonably probable potential uses:
O'Neill v. State Department of Roads (Nebraska,
1963), 118 N. W. 2d 616:
Specifically, he (appraiser) based his opinion
on comparable sales, that at some time it could
be re-zoned, its reasonable probable potential
uses, and re-zoning at the time bearing in
mind recognition of probable imminence of rezoning, plus knowledge of real estate. All of
the elements mentioned here as the foundation
on which the opinion of the witness was given
were proper to be considered by him in the
giving of his testimony. In addition to a consideration of the elements mentioned the witness gave testimony as to need for putting the
area in condition for residential and industrial use and considered all of these things in
his opinion as to the value at the time of condemnation. It is of course true that involved
was an entry into the realm of speculation, but
it is one which is not condemned.
Being restricted to the point where defendants
were only able to develop a shell of a case based upon
a value for possible limited housing development of
a small-farm basis permitted under the agricultural
zoning, the restriction against developing evidence of
a probable re-zoning continued when counsel for de-
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fendants attempted to cross-examine the witnesses
for plaintiff. Illustrations concerning this impossible situation occurred upon the cross examination
of plaintiff's witness, Mr. Solomon:
Q. I see. Mr. Solomon, you stated in your qualifications that you have actually been a subdivider yourself.

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And was some of this land zoned agricultural when you purchased it with ultimate
subdivision ideas in mind?
MR. CAMPBELL:
Now, if the Court please, we will object to that
on the ground and for the reason that it is
an attempt to do what counsel has been prohibited from doing during this entire trial;
and that is to provide - require a witness
to testify as to the illegal and prohibited use,
and we object to the question and form of it.
THE COURT:
The objection is sustained, Mr. Fuller. (Tr.
394)
And the same ruling was received when defendants' counsel cross-examined Mr. Iverson:
Q. I see. Do you have occasional requests for
rezoning in the county?

MR. CAMPBELL:
If the Court please, we'll object to that on the
ground that it is irrelevant and calls for an
answer that would lead us into speculative
and conjectural areas.
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THE COURT:
I'm sure the answer to the question is yes,
Mr. Fuller, that they do have occasional requests for rezoning; but I can't see that it is
rna terial in this case.
MR. FULLER:
We would explore the subject, with the Court's
permission; and I take it the ruling would be
adverse to that.
THE COURT:
The Court isn't going to grant you permission.
(Tr. 430)
As a final and complete blow to defendants' case
the Court appeared to be considerably influenced by
a statement made by attorney Campbell to the effect
that Judge Thornley Swan had made a similar ruling concerning zoning in a Davis County case which
was then on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, and
which had been initially tried by attorney Campbell.
(Tr. 52) Mr. Campbell stated there that Judge Swan
rejected a proffer of proof as a matter of law upon
the basis that " ... the highest and best use of the
property must be determined as it was situated at
the date of condemnation; ... "
Based upon Mr. Campbell's statement concerning the Davis County case, Judge Day stated:
... and I am inclined to agree with Mr. Campbell's statement with regard to Judge Swan.
(Tr. 63)
Being unable to believe that Judge Swan had
made as sweeping a rule as was presented to the
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Court at the trial, counsel for defendants immediately following the trial went to the office of the Supreme Court and secured the trial brief of the State
of Utah in the Davis County matter involving Judge
Swan. As suspected, Judge Swan ruled on a related
matter where there was a non-conforming usage
which had been abandoned, and subsequent attempts
to re-zone which were rejected. The significant portion of the brief contained an absolute admission on
the part of the State of Utah that a probability of
re-zoning clearly states the law. We quote from the
State's brief in the matter:
However, where the enactment of the zoning
restrictions is not predicated upon the inherent evil of the proscribed use - in other
words, where the forbidden use is malum prohibitum rather than malum in se- and there
is a possibility or probability that the zoning
restriction may in the near future be repealed
or amended so as to permit the use in question, such likelihood may be considered if the
prospect of such repeal or amendment is sufficiently likely as to have appreciable influence
upon present market value though such possible change in the zoning regulations must
not be speculative. ( 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 12.322.)
See State of Utah, by and Through its Road
Commission v. Holt (Case No. 9763).
When the same case was decided by the Utah
Supreme Court (381 P 2d 724- May 27, 1963) it
became clear that the issue was different from that
involved in this case in that the Davis County case
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involved discontinuance of non-conforming uses and
because in that case the property owner did not give
" ... proof or proffer of proof that there was a probability of a zoning change or variance in the near
future to commercial."
In view of what appears tc be a complete misrepresentation of the Davis County case, whether
the misrepresentation was intentional or not, it undoubtedly served to cause the Court to so restrict the
defendants' case as to make it impossible to present
evidence supporting a higher and better usage for
the subject property other than for agricultural and
grazing uses.
At the conclusion of the trial the Court instructed the Jury as follows :
INSTRUCTION NO. 16
You are instructed that the subject property
to be acquired by the State of Utah herein
was, on the 20th day of September, 1962,
zoned by Washington County for grazing and
agricultural usage.
In that connection, you are further instructed
that the usage of the subject property for residential subdivision and commercial enterprises, or either of them, was prohibited by
County Ordinance. ( R. 95)
CONCLUSION
Based upon the rulings and the instruction given it is not surprising that the jury returned aver-
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diet of $16,000.00, which represented the highest
appraisal placed upon the property for solely agricultural and grazing uses as was testified to by the
appraiser for the plaintiff who placed the highest
value on the property for such uses. It is submitted
that the Court was clearly in error and that the
interests of justice can only be served by granting
a new trial which will at least permit defendants
to place in evidence their theory of the highest and
best use to which the property was adaptable at the
time of the taking, and where the existing zoning
regulation will be given such weight concerning other
than proscribed uses as it is entitled to receive.
Respectfully submitted,
M. V. BACKMAN of Backman,
Backman & Clark,
Glen E. Fuller,
Richard M. Taylor,
Attorneys for appellants
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